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Introduction
Less than a year after George MacDonald’s death in 1905, Joseph Johnson published the
first biography of MacDonald. Johnson’s biography dwells on MacDonald’s role as a novelist,
which reveals his immediate posthumous legacy. This reception has shifted. Over the past three
decades, MacDonald has been described as an explicitly Christian author while much of the
criticism about MacDonald emphasizes his role as a fairy tale author and theologian. In response
to the pigeonholing of MacDonald, my thesis aims to reposition his writings within the history of
the realist novel through their engagement with science.
Why did George MacDonald jump off the radar? Why is MacDonald not studied as much
today? One possibility is his overt Scottishness. His heavy use of dialect simply makes him hard
to read, but the investment is fully worth the struggle and timely, given the attention to Scotland
and Celtic figures in the past twenty years. Somewhat more insidiously and relevant for a
Marxist understanding, his overt Scottishness may have been off-putting to the superstructure of
English critical sensibilities in the early 20th century. After the series of uprisings in Ireland, nonEnglish identities became more suspect, and as a result, Scottishness became more demure. Sir
Walter Scott initially suffered a similar fate.
The fall-off of MacDonald’s popularity also suggests something about changed attitudes
towards science and literature. As C.P. Snow argues in The Two Cultures, the 20th century
underwent a division “into two polar groups” (3) between science and humanities. As a writer
trained in science at Aberdeen University, MacDonald’s writings are influenced by his
background and embody his interest in science. Because they engage with science, his novels are
thus antithetical to this 20th-century change from a unified culture to the stratification between
science and humanities. As it occurred, the erasure of MacDonald from critical analysis was
neither unnoticed nor without lament. C.S. Lewis writes in his introduction to George
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MacDonald: An Anthology that “I have never concealed the fact that I regarded him as my
master; indeed I fancy I have never written a book in which I did not quote from him” (20). In
W.H. Auden’s introduction to the 1954 combined reprinting of Lilith and Phantastes, he praises
MacDonald’s “power to project his inner life into images, beings, landscapes which are valid for
all,” which serve to make him “one of the most remarkable writers of the nineteenth century”
(vi).
Because of MacDonald’s nuanced view of Christianity, his engagement with the
epistemological doubts and anxieties surrounding scientific developments provides a useful
counterpoint to the Muscular Christianity of writers like Charles Kingsley. MacDonald’s novels
portray a panentheistic, non-institutional form of Christianity that resists reactionary attitudes.
His novels stand between traditional religious faith and the anxiety, doubt, and skepticism that
characterize modernity, but they emphasize the possibilities of human ingenuity and rational
investigation. This thesis will examine David Elginbrod, Lilith, and Alec Forbes of Howglen as
negotiations between public attitudes towards religion and scientific knowledge in a manner that
moves beyond a presumed opposition between these categories. The object is to reorient
MacDonald by analyzing how his novels respond to contemporary science and changing ideas
about individuals and society. While describing and critiquing the compartmentalization of
knowledge into discrete discourses and reactionary attitudes toward evolutionary theory and
materiality, his novels praise the productive capability for scientific knowledge and vocabularies
to understand and describe the relationship between God, nature, and the self.
This project has a predecessor in George MacDonald’s grandson, Greville MacDonald.
Greville responded to Johnson’s biography of George MacDonald by writing his own in 1924. In
this biography, George MacDonald and His Wife, Greville notes George MacDonald’s
relationships with several writers and influential people from the period including F.D. Maurice,
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Charles Kingsley, Lady Byron, Mark Twain, and Charles Dodgson, which qualifies Joseph
Johnson’s insistence that MacDonald’s primary success was his appeal to a broad audience.
Greville MacDonald reproduces several letters between George MacDonald and these figures to
reinforce a view of MacDonald as heavily immersed in the intellectual environment of his time.
MacDonald’s later novels are highly concerned with contemporary social and political issues and
not simply a form of nostalgic, adventurous storytelling. Critics like Geoffrey Reiter have begun
to examine the presence of these elements. In “‘Down the Winding Stair’: Victorian Popular
Science and Deep Time in ‘The Golden Key,’” he argues that “The Golden Key” is shaped by
newfound geological knowledge, a fact that is conveyed by the omission of an Old Man of the
Air since the earth never underwent an air-only stage (Reiter 10).
David Elginbrod resists the portrayal of knowledge as a fragmenting force and stresses
the web-like nature of nature, society, bodies, and minds. Alec Forbes portrays the clash between
the qualitative folk knowledge represented by Annie Anderson and other country people and the
informational, intellectual knowledge of urban dwellers like Mr. Cupples, who lives in the same
boarding house as Alec and serves as the librarian at the school that he attends. Its
autobiographical qualities indicate MacDonald’s navigation of this modern dichotomy. The
novel addresses these issues through references to the transitory unity of systems and the
importance of cooperating elements. The development of the fairy-like Little Ones in Lilith into
a more mature, organized, and adaptive society shows MacDonald’s interest in evolutionary
discourse and embracement of its implications for spirituality and teleology. Analyzing the
engagement with science in MacDonald’s novels will attest to the importance of refiguring this
non-canonical yet highly important novelist. His writings creatively negotiate the perceived
divide between the domains of religion and scientific, experimental knowledge in ways that have
been ignored. This reorientation of MacDonald presents the possibility for continued discourse
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on the range of responses of 19th-century writers to emergent discoveries and how science
influenced their novelistic aesthetics and attitudes.
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Beyond Productivity:
Natural Philosophy and Connectivity in David Elginbrod
As Alberto Gabriele observes in Reading Popular Culture in Victorian Print,
“modernity” is “specifically (but not exclusively) in the period that witnessed the widespread
affirmation of a fragmented but not less systematic organization of industrial production, visual
perception, and social order” (2). In response to the fragmentation of knowledge and social
structures in Scotland and England during the middle of the 19th century, David Elginbrod
presents a non-dualistic approach to knowledge, society, and the self and stresses the
interdependence of these categories. The fragmenting forces that the novel resists include an
increasingly stricter division between fields of knowledge through the generation of specialized
or discipline-specific discourses, a product-focused approach to education, and a perceived
Protestant division of grace from nature, which the novel attributes to doctrines of election and
sola fide. These social changes exploit the vulnerabilities ascribed to a fragile and fragmented
modernity, which is demonstrated through Herr von Funkelstein, a character who easily deceives
and entertains the middle and upper classes through performed séances, and the speaker at a
“biology” lecture, a person who readily deceives the townspeople and claims to offer an
understanding of “biology” for small lecture fees. This novel makes use of natural philosophy to
resist this fragmentation and associated exploitation in two important ways.
The first way is through the novel’s laudatory evaluation of instruction in natural
philosophy as complementary to an individual’s development. The novel rejects a utilitarian,
product-based approach to the instruction of natural philosophy. In Victorian Popularizers of
Science, Bernard Lightman brings attention to the rising concern expressed by thinkers like
William Whewell that “the sciences were losing their unity, disintegrating” (22) just like “a great
empire falling to pieces” (Whewell qtd. in Lightman 23). In response to the problems of
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fragmentation, David Elginbrod proposes an instructive method of natural philosophy and
mathematical subjects that aims for unity of self and knowledge, society, cosmological unity, and
education over fragmented, rigidly divisive pedagogical methods.
As Lightman observes, “the first four decades of the nineteenth century” saw the rise of
“popular science” works that were eventually released in a “cheap format” (23). According to
Jonathan Topham, “the treatises arguably represented a nascent publishing form that would later
be called ‘popular science’;—a form that publishers were very soon to find highly numerative”
(Topham qtd. in Lightman 23). Lightman references the Bridgewater Treatises and explains that
these works were from the beginning supposed to argue for the “Power, Wisdom, and Goodness
of God, as manifested in the Creation” (Kirby qtd. in Lightman 23). David Elginbrod participates
in this (economically profitable) movement but argues for an even less rigid division between
God and nature than that which occasioned these natural theologies.
The second form of resistance against fragmentation is that the language and explanatory
models of science and mechanics are used aesthetically to describe the interdependence of
interiority, social institutions, nature, and their interrelations. These instances of scientific
language include thoughts described as an “electric flash” (2: 134); a woman “naturally disposed
to somnambulism” (3: 212); “the nervous element” (3: 206); “nerves of the human body” (3:
206); “nervous gear” (1: 146); the mind and body as a “machine” with “thinking wheels” (1:
146); the mind as a “steam-engine” (2: 29); “nerves of the human body” (3: 206); hallucinations
resulting from an “overwrought brain” (2: 85); numerous allusions to associationalism with
thoughts described as “links in the chain of ideas” (2: 134); “brain;” “nervous system” (2: 184);
“photo-materialist” (2: 326); “natural laws” (3: 206); though phrenological, an allusion to the
frontal lobes as “two foremost bumps” (3: 339); the “Baconian method” (2: 173);
“psychological, social, literary, and scientific receipts” (2: 125); an ongoing critique of
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spiritualists’ misuse of terms like “biology” and “electricity;” the “elasticity” (1: 129) of
muscles; and a description of bodily affect through reference to anatomy as David’s “hm” that is
uttered through “closed lips and open nasal passage” (1: 88). A scientific idiom inflects the
novel’s portrayal of character and sociality.
As John Kucich observes in “Intellectual Debate in the Victorian Novel: Religion,
Science, and the Professional,” the Victorian novel tends to be “predominantly a novel of
domestic manners, not a novel of ideas” (Kucich 107). On the other hand, “intellectual debates
informed Victorian fiction so powerfully that it would not be inaccurate to say that those debates
governed both the form and the substance of the genre” (107). David Elginbrod is such a novel.
It is preoccupied with ideas like the interdependence of the self, society, the environment, and
the respective interpretative gestures of religion and science to make sense of the world. This
interdependence is proposed as a key to the fragmentation of modern society and the answer and
guiding principle for scientific instruction and intellectual attempts to understand nature.
In David Elginbrod, MacDonald proposes a panentheistic view of God and draws upon
Neoplatonism and German Romanticism through writers like Schiller and Schleiermacher.
MacDonald’s theology is akin to what Robert Richards describes in The Romantic Conception of
Life as the English response to Naturphilosophie, which moved beyond the “dynamische
Evolution” of Schilling and Goethe, a theory that “explained the appearance of archetypal
variations in nature as a consequence of gradual development, or evolution, which instantiated
ideal forms” to the English “relocat[ion] of archetypes in the Divine mind and their appearance
in nature as the result of God’s creative activity” (10). MacDonald’s heavy involvement in a nonproselytizing, non-institutional form of Christianity separates him somewhat from the political
pressure that “thinkers like Joseph Henry Green and Richard Owen” experienced due to the
“risked charges of irreligion” (10). MacDonald’s faith in God, a God that includes nature but
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extends beyond nature, seems to be genuine, which is why his worldview can be neither
categorized as strictly pantheistic nor theistic. The appellation of panentheism, a God that
includes nature and a notion of God as extending beyond that, most accurately describes
MacDonald’s belief in God.
MacDonald places this panentheistic view of God at odds with a perceived Protestant
division of grace from nature. By arguing that God includes nature, he prizes the importance of
natural philosophy and the intellect over and against this division. As Margaret explains,
speaking as the apostle for her father, David Elginbrod, “if ever anything looks beautiful or
lovely to me, then I know at once that God is that” (2: 224). This statement adopts a Platonic
view of nature. God can be found in what is good, beautiful, and true, and nature is a place where
all three of these things can be located. The narrator laudably notes Wordsworth’s “Christian
Pantheism,” the “soul” of his poetry, as “being beyond [the] comprehension” (1: 86) of Hugh at
that point in the narrative.
Characters like Mrs. Appleditch display the shortcomings of a Christianity that sees a
sharp division between grace and nature. Towards the end of the novel, David Elginbrod’s
protagonist, Hugh Sutherland serves as a tutor to her children who are aspiring Reformed
ministers. The narrator describes Mrs. Appleditch as a woman who “considered reason as an
awful enemy to the soul, and obnoxious to God, especially when applied to find out what he
means when he addresses us as reasonable creatures” (3: 148). Since reason is divorced from the
soul in this model, this Reformed view on reason is dualistic. The novel’s critique of the
epistemological implications concerning total depravity stresses Reformed Christianity’s role in
the disunity of the individual.
The roots of Calvinism in Scotland run deep. Essentially and operationally independent
from the Church of England, the Church of Scotland’s investment in Calvinism was stronger
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than that of the Church of England and other English Christian movements, which entertained a
variety and admixture of views on the role of free will and grace ala Arminianism. Arminianism
failed to achieve a notable presence in Scotland. Calvinism dominated Scottish society in
numerous ways. One of the key features of Calvinism is a belief in the total depravity of
individuals. In this model, individuals have free will but are utterly dependent on the free grace
of God to elect people to salvation. With this view, the knowledge and experience derived from
the intellect is suspect and cannot lead to salvation. As grace emerges from some point beyond
experience and knowledge, this feature distinctly divides grace and nature. Only divine
intervention can lead to salvation, not direct experience of nature or the world. K. Theodore
Hoppen’s The Mid-Victorian Generation 1846-1886 chronicles the “mid-century decline of strict
Calvinism,” though he notes that “in England the chief attack was mounted by theologians with
liberal inclinations” while “in Scotland Calvinism was undermined by Evangelicals who stuck
closely to Biblical literalism and a belief in eternal punishment” (448). Unlike the majority of
Scottish anti-Calvinists, MacDonald argues against Calvinism from the perspective of a liberal
Christianity.
Hugh resists Calvinism, which is understood by the text to condemn naturalistic enquiry a
priori due to the consideration of human reason as fundamentally untrustworthy and depraved.
Calvinism moves beyond Lutheranism and broad Anglican conceptions of the role of free will by
arguing that depravity affects all expressions of will, even in matters beyond salvation. In
response, the non-division between humans, nature, and reason is reinforced through Hugh’s
commitment to growing a beard. MacDonald places Hugh’s panentheistic view of God in
collision with Calvinism, represented by Mrs. Appleditch. She objects to Hugh’s beard on the
grounds that “it is a shame for a man to let his beard grow like a monkey” (3: 165). Her remark
reveals Victorian anxieties about Darwinism. She fears the uncanny encounter of Hugh with
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features that remind her of a monkey and thus her own origins. Hugh defends his beard by saying
that “the Apostles themselves wore beards” and that “there is nothing dirty about them” (3: 166).
This observation recalls the narrator’s earlier reference to Schiller, which is that “death cannot be
an evil, for it is universal” (Schiller qtd. in MacDonald 3: 138). Hugh’s beard cannot be evil
because it is natural and universal to humans. Its lack of a purpose does not detract from its
importance. The pressure placed upon Hugh by Mrs. Appleditch to professionalize and fulfill the
role of a tutor to her sons causes him to quit his appointment. The narrative rewards Hugh
Sutherland for this action through the benefaction of Robert Falconer, a gentleman, amateur
detective who enables Hugh to recover a stolen ring that belonged to Hugh’s former employer.
Falconer provides Hugh with the pecuniary means to pursue this object and continue his
novelistic pursuits.
Like Hugh’s beard, the novel resists the idea that education and knowledge are useful
only insofar as they contribute to some sort of economic production. Hugh’s beard represents a
negative type of economic production—by not having a beard, Hugh can look respectable and
present himself more professionally, which would conceivably aid him in securing students and
finding more of them through character references. His choice to accept what is natural, his
beard, represents the artificial vanity of an economic order that seeks to divide individuals from
their natural selves and bodies as much as from the animal world.
Instead of placing an emphasis on productivity, the novel argues in line with Newman
and Arnold’s claims for liberal education and “culture,” respectively, that education and
knowledge are pursuits that should be universally, unconditionally inherited by a nation’s
citizens without emphasis placed on the usefulness of these fields for economic production. For
example, the titular character of David Elginbrod is a man of science par excellence and stands
for the proper orientation of human subjects to education. Because his education at fifty-five
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lacks practical results, he stands for the importance of acquired knowledge beyond utilitarian and
economically profitable ends. The instruction in mathematics and literature that Hugh provides
to David Elginbrod does not grant David the means to improve his social position or become a
better worker. The closest feature to a utilitarian purpose that David’s education provides is that
he might learn the principles behind the mathematical functions that he performs as a “bailiff”
(1: 14) for his master, William Glasford, but simply understanding these principles does not
presumably help David perform his job any better.
Hugh’s instruction of David Elginbrod mirrors the rise of public education through
societies like the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (SDUK). In Useful Knowledge,
Alan Rauch discusses the growth (and demise) of this society and others like it. The SDUK
published works meant to increase public knowledge for the sake of social improvement. Rauch
notes that “useful knowledge” meant “contentious knowledge” (41) and was connected to the
Whigs’ party platform of an “interest in education and the dissemination of knowledge” (41). He
further explains that the society “may not have been aware of the problematic nature of such
terms as useful” (41) since the instructional materials contained information that moved beyond
mere material for becoming better workers. This irony illustrates just how ingrained was this
association between public education and utility. Even with aims beyond simply making people
better at their jobs, this society employed the term “useful” as an attempt to justify its project.
This democratic view of education runs counter to two observations that Jim Endersby
makes about Victorian education in Imperial Nature. The first observation is that education
partially arose to “ensure that the masses…would behave as the responsible citizens they now
were” (277). Furthermore, geography achieved greater recognition over the 19th century because
of its connections to empire. Mr. Arnold, the father of Hugh’s second pupil, Harry Arnold,
demonstrates this tendency. The narrator describes Mr. Arnold as having “a weakness for
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geography” (2: 37). Upon learning that Hugh has provided no geographical instruction to Harry,
Mr. Arnold expresses consternation and insists that “[a] thorough geographical knowledge is
essential to the education of a gentleman” (2: 38). This sentiment conflates commerce and
conceptions surrounding the necessary elements of a gentleman’s education. As a man of
business, Mr. Arnold represents a view of geography’s importance as connected to gentlemanly
attributes and the support and knowledge of imperial endeavors. Geographic knowledge’s
usefulness emerges from its perceived connections to commerce.
MacDonald’s novel resists this utilitarian perspective on learning by presenting an
alternative model of education that locates the learning experience within the self and the self’s
interaction with its external environment. The material products of an education, the external
productions of individuals like Hugh and his poems, are deemphasized without deemphasizing
the materiality of subjects, particularly their minds, those “thinking wheels…driven by nervous
gear” (1: 146). While recognizing the materiality and mechanicality of thoughts and the human
mind, the narrative portrays the human subject as transcendent and beyond interpretation.
Concerning Hugh’s poems, the narrator observes that “what a man has produced, is not what he
is. He may even impoverish his true self by production” (2: 136-137). In other words, individuals
should not be judged by their productions, and the very creation of products is seen as a form of
impoverishment, which places the economic system on its head. What rises in its place is an
elevated sense of the individual and interiority placed over and above production. Production is
paradoxically a form of “impoverish[ment].” This quotation reinforces the idea that the benefits
of education are not limited to products, and the human subject is not limited to what he or she
can produce. In short, capitalism and utilitarianism, not “science,” is to blame for social
fragmentation in this novel.
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This concern for the preservation of the individual and a belief in knowledge for
knowledge’s sake is well-embodied in Matthew Arnold’s valorization of Hellenism over
Philistinism. In Culture and Anarchy, Arnold identifies Philistinism and Hebraising as a “narrow
conception of man’s spiritual range and of his one thing needful” (15), which is salvation.
Instead, Arnold argues, “salvation” consists of a “harmonious perfection only to be won by
unreservedly cultivating many sides in us” (16), a view that he aligns with Hellenism. As a
bailiff and committed adult learner who experiences no external benefit from learning, David
Elginbrod embodies this conception of a well-cultivated individual who finds peace and
salvation through the development of his many sides. Hugh Sutherland, a tutor, lover, aspiring
poet and novelist, improves through his attention to his own many sides. This many-sided
development allows him to help others. He does not merely improve through becoming more
religious or strictly adhering to any one goal in life.
If the human subject is not limited by external realities yet is not a soul in isolation, being
influenced by material conditions while still retaining interiority, where is its place? David
Elginbrod thematically explores this question and uses the aesthetics of scientific language to
study the individual in connection with one’s external environment and social experience. The
inability of human subjects to overcome their materiality and dependence upon social
institutions, environments, and accidents, the “links in a chain” that shape personalities (2: 134),
is reinforced by the narrator’s observation that “a great many of our dislikes, both to persons and
things, arise from a feeling of discomfort associated with them, perhaps only accidentally present
in our minds the first time we met them” (3: 231). This latter element corresponds with the
psychological theory of associationism, which had a number of supporters at this time. The
attention that is paid to the self’s dependence upon external reality, particularly one’s social role,
is consonant with most 19th-century fiction.
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David Elginbrod lies within this literary vein of self-exploration in relation to one’s
social role and uses mechanical language to describe this relationship. Early in the narrative,
Hugh’s recognition of society and nature as a respective web and machine brings him enormous
discomfort. The narrator describes how a “horror” falls on Hugh when he considers that “the
mighty All of nature should be only a mechanism” (3: 179). Likewise, when Hugh arrives in
London, he sees the interconnection of human beings, the “whole mass…bound together,
interwoven, and matted, by the crossing and inter-twisting threads of interest, mutual help, and
relationship of every kind” and “soon [finds] how hard it was to get within the mass at all” (3:
51). Before Hugh can move towards an appreciation for the interconnectivity of life and selfrecognition as a part of nature, he must first go through a painful sensation of isolation from the
world and ignorance about his role in society. He must learn to stop worrying and love the
machine.
This attention to the interconnectedness of life matches with the aesthetic use of scientific
language in Walter Pater’s “Conclusion” to The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry. Pater
describes the interconnectedness of elements and the movement of natural forces.
Like the elements of which we are composed, the action of these forces extends
beyond us: it rusts iron and ripens corn. Far out on every side of us those elements
are broadcast, driven in many currents; and birth and gesture and death and the
springing of violets from the grave are but a few out of ten thousand resultant
combinations. That clear, perpetual outline of face and limb is but an image of
ours, under which we group them — a design in a web, the actual threads of
which pass out beyond it. (152-153)
Although individuals are never granted more than “a design in a web,” some subset of a greater
unity that extends to “the actual threads” that “pass out beyond it,” individuals can recognize
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these forces in small designs. On the other hand, this recognition is transitory, for “it is with this
movement, with the passage and dissolution of impressions, images, sensations, that analysis
leaves off” (154). Pater argues that “to burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain
this ecstasy, is success in life” (157).
Hugh Sutherland comes to appreciate the flickering, web-like connectivity of life. The
thought of being just part of a larger web of connections comes to serve as a fruitful, hopeful
idea.
How many things which, at the first moment, strike us as curious coincidences,
afterwards become so operative on our lives, and so interwoven with the whole
web of their histories, that instead of appearing any more as strange accidents,
they assume the shape of unavoidable necessities, of homely, ordinary, lawful
occurrences, as much in their own place as any shaft or pinion of a great machine!
(3: 120-121)
Rather than lamenting a loss of a Romantic self into the void of chance relations, the narrator
embraces the absorption of the individual into a larger web of connections. MacDonald places
this viewpoint above what Richard Cronin describes as Romantic Victorians’ qualified
appreciation for the German Romantic conception of the “omnipotent and isolated will” as
represented by figures like the titular character of Arthur Coningsby by John Sterling when he
“falls under the spell of Kreuzner, the German metaphysician” (219). The individual is thus
recognized as transcendent not because of the transcendence of the self (or if so, just partially)
but also due to the interdependence of one’s identity, material existence within an environment
largely beyond individual control, and social relationships. The human subject is described as
operating within a larger framework and achieving purpose within a “great machine” as a “shaft”
or “pinion” (3: 121). A person’s own thoughts are dependent on “thinking wheels” that are
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driven by “nervous gear” that have the ability to arrive at the “minute accuracies of a steamengine” (1: 146), all of which suggest a cooperation of elements.
This framework is not a stable, complete process. It depends on these “unavoidable
necessities” (3: 121). Gillian Beer argues in “The Reader’s Wager: Lots, Sorts, and Futures” that
the Victorian period was attuned to the challenge that evolution places on the design argument,
which was a “period when evolutionary theory was making classification itself a narrative of
change rather than an enduring system of types but when patterns of genetic inheritance had not
yet been established” (276). A seeming disconnect existed between the second law of
thermodynamics, which holds that “entropy (disorganization) tends to a maximum” (276). On
the other hand, the period began to see that “variation is the medium of radical change” (276).
Future patterns therefore became difficult to descry. The new theories unsettled
knowledge of the past and prediction of the future. Instead of constant rediscovery
of stable norms the future became irregular, chancy, peopled by speculative types
whose relation to the present might repeat and extend the scandal of our relation
to other earlier species (276)
MacDonald’s novel accepts this reality of chance. He allots for chance and accepts that their
existence is “as much in their own place as any shaft or pinion of a great machine” (3: 121).
Beyond mechanical language, David Elginbrod uses the language of electricity, botany,
and optics to describe the characteristics of the self and its relationship to society. This language
appears especially during descriptions of learning experiences, which reinforces MacDonald’s
preoccupation with the non-division of human knowledge and the universalizing importance of
science. During her private education with Hugh, Maggie feels as if the overcoming of
pedagogical difficulties is like a “light” that “flashe[s] upon her” from “her own lucent nature”
(1: 105). Elsewhere, Hugh feels as if “his spirit flash[es] in the lightning” (2: 112) of a storm.
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Language of interdependence is used throughout. Associationism is explored through the
language used to describe workings of the mind. Thoughts are consistently spoken of as a
physical process that occurs through the interdependence of ideas, the “strange association of
ideas” proceeding like “slender” “links in a chain” upon which the “electric flash of thought” is
said to proceed (2: 134). Hugh’s poems are described as the “cobwebs sprung from his own
brain” (2: 136) which not only brings attention to Hugh’s initial failure as a poet (though he later
becomes a well-received novelist) but also recalls the language of connectivity and formed
associations.
These recurrent descriptions of the human mind as a series of associations parallel the
19th-century shift from novels with a single plot and one perspective to novels with multiple plots
and interlocking timelines. In The Novel and the Police, D.A. Miller discusses the reification of
the trifle. He observes that “the ‘genetic’ organization of narrative allows the significant trifle to
be elaborated temporally: in minute networks of causality that inexorably connect one such trifle
to another” (Miller 30). The fact that this novel is called David Elginbrod, a character who
appears only in the first book of the novel, demonstrates the emphasis that this novel places on
the interdependence between human behaviors and identities with seeming trifles. A seeming
trifle, this character who only appears in the first few chapters of the novel drives all future
action. Hugh’s short-term tutoring appointment with the Turriepuffit family for whom David
Elginbrod works begins a lifelong journey of self-discovery beyond the knowledge provided by
his studies at a university.
Because trifles are reified in David Elginbrod, the division of natural philosophy into
discrete categories, specialized discourses, is shown to be insufficient, which serves as a
commentary on the stratification of discourse over the 19th century. Foucault notes the following
about commentary in The Birth of the Clinic.
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Commentary questions discourse as to what it says and intended to say; it tries to
uncover that deeper meaning of speech that enables it to achieve an identity with
itself, supposedly nearer to its essential truth; in other words, in stating what has
been said, one has to re-state what has never been said. In this activity known as
commentary which tries to transmit an old, unyielding discourse seemingly silent
to itself, into another, more prolix discourse that is both more archaic and more
contemporary—is concealed a strange attitude towards language: to comment is
to admit by definition an excess of the signified over the signifier; a necessary,
unformulated remainder of thought that language has left in the shade—a
remainder that is the very essence of that thought, driven outside its secret—but to
comment also presupposes that this unspoken element slumbers within speech
(parole), and that, by a super-abundance proper to the signifier, one may, in
questioning it, give voice to a content that was not explicitly signified. (Foucault
xvi)
Without arriving in the straits of a nihilistic epistemology in which language can communicate
nothing, the novel provides a “commentary” on the deepening divides between the discourses of
naturalistic inquiry by demonstrating that the trifling details of one field are useful for another,
especially for instruction. This assumption of integration was common to 19th-century scientific
writing. Mary Somerville’s The Connection of Physical Sciences from 1834 stresses that “in all
[sciences] there exists such a bond of union, that proficiency cannot be attained in any one
without a knowledge of others” (3). The nineteenth century persistently reattained the
importance of the unity of knowledge, even while the creation of specialized discourses
challenged translatability between fields.
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During his instruction of Harry Arnold, Hugh teaches him how to measure the height of
the Arnolds’ ancestral home by using a quadrant. Rather than splitting Harry’s education into
discrete categories, Hugh uses this moment to teach geography, geometry, and architecture
simultaneously. The benefits of this pedagogical method are displayed through Harry’s
transformation from a boy with hypochondriac fears and an incessant desire to consume books
without retaining anything, bound to merely finishing every word in a text, to a bright pupil with
a unified perspective and authentic desire for knowledge. This authenticity is communicated by
the deal that Hugh strikes up with Harry. Hugh agrees not to teach Latin to Harry until Harry
personally asks Hugh for Latin lessons. By baiting Harry with the story of Caesar’s assassination
and “filling up the account with portions from Shakspere” (2: 26) Hugh skillfully utilizes the
intersection of England’s literary history and Classical history with Latin instruction to garner
Harry’s interest.
The educational methods espoused throughout David Elginbrod provide individuals with
more than just self-development: these methods provide people with the ability to resist false and
potentially exploitative approaches to naturalistic inquiry. MacDonald’s novel underscores the
exploitative possibilities of education through parasitic individuals and organizations with
purportedly populist aims. The Herr von Funkelstein is such a person, and the spiritualist
movement to which he belongs falls under this category. Masquerading as a charitable
enterprise, the “biology” lecture that Hugh attends while tutoring Harry Arnold draws in the
public by marketing its project as a lecture for the public.
“Biology” and spiritualism are further criticized through two objections that the text
broaches towards the subject, the first blatantly and the second obliquely. The first objection is
the religious consideration that even if spiritualism is real, spiritualism only affords contact to the
lower souls who are degenerately attached to the “putrifying remnants” of their bodies and thus
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represent the “canaille of the other world” (3: 175). These “canaille” cannot provide any
worthwhile knowledge, especially spiritual knowledge. Mrs. Elton, a highly religious, Reformed
Christian and relative of Mr. Arnold, finds solace in spiritualism because she sees spiritualist
enterprises as confirmed “Spiritual Manifestations” of “another world” and “corroboration” of
“Sacred Writ” (2: 211). The bankruptcy of these spiritual canaille is communicated through their
banality. Spiritualism is not seen as a source or type of change but rather reinforces orthodox
religiosity, which allows for Mrs. Elton to feel even more comfortable in her misguided
Christianity.
The second objection to spiritualism is materially grounded: spiritualism relies on a
misapplication of “the true Baconian method” (2: 173), as the con man, Herr von Funkelstein,
refers to it. The heading of Chapter VIII in Book 1 introduces this novel’s interest in scientific
inquiry by quoting Bacon:
It is the property of good and sound knowledge, to putrifie and dissolve into a
number of subtle, idle, unwholesome, and (as I may tearme them) vermiculate
questions; which have indeed a kinde of quicknesse, and life of spirite, but no
soundnesse of matter, or goodnesse of quality. (Bacon qtd. in MacDonald 1: 92)
The spiritualist movement and von Funkelstein fall under Bacon’s critique of speculation that
arises from reputable sciences by asking questions that lack “soundnesse of matter” and
“goodnesse of quality.” The lecturer’s talk on “biology” (2: 117) and Hugh’s personal discussion
with von Funkelstein afterwards, who claims to have superior knowledge of “physicosychological phenomena to which the name of spiritualism has been so absurdly applied” (2:
170) and the ability to improve Hugh’s understanding of so-called biology after the exploitative
lecture, demonstrates this parasitic dependency of spiritualism on a convoluted understanding of
natural philosophy and first principles. Herr von Funkelstein describes the Baconian method as
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“to inquire first what the thing is, by recording observations and experiments made in its
supposed direction” (1: 173). Since only the “observations and experiments” that are “made in”
the “supposed direction” of one’s inquiry are recorded, such an exposition of the scientific
method allows for bias and willful tampering with results. This approach allows for observations
and experiments to be discarded that do not align with one’s desired results.
However, Robert Falconer, the private gentleman-detective that aids Hugh in capturing
von Funkelstein, champions a rational approach to scientific inquiry. When Robert Falconer and
Hugh begin their investigation of the count, Robert tacitly raises this second objection to
spiritualism’s self-proclaimed utilization of the scientific method. After Hugh explains Euphra’s
connection to the count, Robert Falconer remarks that he now has “material out of which to
construct a theory” and that only now can he “make inquiry upon the theory” like “Lord Bacon
says” (3: 176). Falconer starts with facts before beginning his inquiry and formulating a theory.
Thus, Falconer translates what might otherwise be deemed “trifles” into the respectable and
valuable (because integral) form of “facts.” The facts that Hugh provides to Falconer about
Euphra’s connection to the count allow for the count’s eventual discovery. Caught in the web
that he creates through his own crimes, von Funkelstein is indicted by these facts.
Portraying an acute awareness of social changes during this period, David Elginbrod
maturely resists economized education, the misuse of natural philosophy, the modern sense of
separation and disunity, and the increasingly fragmented approach to knowledge without
displacing developments in natural philosophy in order to return to a romanticized past. By
partially placing the blame on Christianity itself for propagating an unproductive division
between grace and nature, MacDonald moves beyond useless nostalgia and embraces his
historical moment, though with qualified reservations. The appearance of vocabularies borrowed
from science displays MacDonald’s brazen endorsement of naturalistic enquiry, and their
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particular use as a way to describe networks, webs, links, and chains provides fertile metaphors
for thinking about individual relationships to social roles. This novel serves as a useful model for
how literary culture responded to 19th-century social changes like the rise of an educated public
and a mechanical, materialistic approach to studying humans and their relation to the world.
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Dissected Unities and Reactionary Plagues:
An Anatomy of the Scottish Public and the Individual in Alec Forbes
Robert Wolff’s The Golden Key: a Study of the Fiction of George MacDonald, published
in 1961, argues that Alec Forbes of Howglen is autobiographical. Regardless of the absolute truth
value of this claim, which has been replicated by subsequent critics like Richard Reis, Alec
Forbes provides a magnified view of a village, Howglen, which corresponds greatly with the
ancestral location of the MacDonald clan in Huntly, Aberdeenshire. Because of this
correspondence, Alec Forbes is useful for considering MacDonald’s possible motivations for
writing about the benefits of science and a generalized, scientific education. The novel likewise
offers the chance to understand the humble environment that shaped one of the 19th century’s
most popular novelists.
Alec Forbes calls attention to public hysteria against scientific enterprises and continues a
concern with the unity of knowledge and positive potentials of scientific pursuits. Published in
1865 just after David Elginbrod, Alec Forbes is the second of MacDonald’s realist novels and is
set “early in the century” (1: 68). The novel occurs from multiple points of view, which include
the perspective of Annie Anderson, an orphan, and the story’s titular character, Alec Forbes.
Alec Forbes is the son of a struggling widow who owes several hundred pounds to Mr. Bruce,
Annie’s irresponsible caretaker. Mr. Bruce, a shopkeeper, embodies the encroachment of
consumerism on this humble town. Mr. Bruce’s self-identification as a descendant of Robert the
Bruce indicates MacDonald’s move beyond mere xenophobia and an elevated romanticism for
all things Scottish. MacDonald breaks from romanticized depictions of Robert the Bruce by
casting his supposed descendant as a despicable character. Despite the novel’s use of a Scottish
dialect, the novel consistently portrays a qualified appreciation for a Scottish identity, especially
through its critique of Scottish religious practices. English customs are only occasionally seen as
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an invading menace, like the rising use of the “cane” (1: 204) in schools over the traditional
taws. The foremost institution criticized by MacDonald is Christianity. Presenting a thoroughly
Romantic view of spirituality, the novel stresses the importance of direct, mystical experience,
which includes encounters with nature.
Due to this appreciation for the vivifying experience of nature and sensations, this text
continues David Elginbrod’s concern for the unity of knowledge and the unity between God and
nature. The narrative condemns the Calvinism of proselytizing missionaries and the more
institutionalized Calvinism of the Church of Scotland. This disdain for Calvinism’s perceived
disjuncture between grace and nature appears in Thomas Crann’s outing of Robert Bruce at a
church meeting. Just before he dies, the minister of the town, Mr. Cowie, gives Annie Anderson
his Bible with a five-pound note enclosed. When Annie returns home to the Bruce family, Mr.
Bruce locks away her Bible in an inaccessible room. Seeking to gain more customers, Mr. Bruce
decides to become a church member of the missionary sect, which is led by Mr. Turnbull. After
service one day, he invites the church members to come to his home after the service for a Bible
reading. Thomas Crann, a stone-mason who befriends Alec and Annie, observes Mr. Bruce
pocket a crumpled piece of paper when he opens the Bible, which is the five-pound note. This
little detail reemerges as Thomas conceives some way to remove the church membership of Mr.
Bruce so that Annie might feel more comfortable joining. When Thomas brings up the issue at
the church meeting eighteen months later, Mr. Turnbull objects. Thomas responds to this
objection as follows.
I haena dune yet. And whaur wad be the place to discuss sic a question but afore
a’ meeting o’ the church? Ca’ ye that the public, sir? Wasna the church institute
for the sake o’ discipleen? Sic things are no to be ironed oot in a hole an’ a corner,
atween you and the deycons, sir. They belang to the haill body. (2: 278)
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Thomas disagrees with the hierarchy embodied by deacons and the division between church and
public affairs. He insists on the importance of this “haill body” coming together “for the sake
o’discipleen” instead of the hierarchy dealing privately with the issue. Thomas’ view, which
wins over the congregation and subdues Mr. Turnbull, presents the necessity of a democratic
forum, a place where moral issues cannot be swept away as improper and dealt with by a select
few. The text critiques the notion that church should be separate from other areas of life and
simultaneously affords a respect for what people can do when they openly work out issues. This
respect shows a desire to move beyond Scottish factionalism, which is embodied in Scottish
novels such as the struggles of Walter Scott’s Henry Morton in Old Mortality. As in Morton’s
situation, the factionalism of competing Christianities threatens Annie and the integrity of
Howglen’s community. Though she recognizes the kindness of Mr. Cowie, Annie desires the less
hierarchal structure of the missionary church that is led by Mr. Turnbull.
A belief in the capabilities of cooperation is tempered by a cynical awareness of mob
mentality. The townspeople who live in the unnamed, “new town” (2: 190) where Alec leads his
studies develop grave suspicions concerning the role of the university community and its
complicity in disinterment.
A panic seized the townspeople in consequence of certain reports connected with
the school of anatomy, which stood by itself in a low neighbourhood. They were
to the effect that great indignities were practised upon the remains of the subjects,
that they were huddled into holes about the place, and so heedlessly, that dogs
might be seen tearing portions from the earth. What truth there may have been at
the root of these reports, I cannot tell…what pushed the indignation beyond the
extreme of popular endurance, was a second rumour, in the consternation
occasioned by which the whole city shared: the resurrectionists were at their foul
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work, and the graveyard, the place of repose, was itself no longer a sanctuary! (2:
117)
The fears of the townspeople embody two impulses. The first is the fear of commoditized bodies.
What “push[es] the indignation beyond the extreme of popular endurance” is this “second
rumour” that the school had been “contenting themselves with asking no questions about the
source whence the means of prosecuting their art was derived” (2: 117). The narrator notes that
the administrators at the school may have been “guilty of indifference,” but the greater blame lies
with the “many a poor creature who would have sold his wife’s body for five pounds” yet are
nonetheless “ready to tear a medical student to pieces on the mere chance that his scalpel had
touched a human form stolen from the sacred enclosure” (2: 117). Furthermore, the townspeople
do not know who to blame. Alec, the hardworking, aspiring physician, is blamed without reason.
The public is presented as illogical, reactionary, and innately suspicious of intellectuals. More
likely, the “culpable carelessness of the servants” (2: 117) is to blame for the hastily disposed of
bodies, which are presented as a possible source for the rumors.
The second impulse emerges from a fear of death. Human anatomy reminds the
townspeople of their mortality. The fear of the scalpel embodies a fear of the body’s
permeability. As Jessie Reeder notes in “Broken Bodies, Permeable Subjects: Rethinking
Victorian Women’s ‘Agency’ in Gaskell’s North and South,” works like North and South present
womanhood as “fundamentally permeable” (par. 6). She further argues that “the novel is littered
with remarkably fragile female bodies that serve a political goal of exposing pollution, suffering,
and inequality” (par. 6). Broken down to their fundamental elements, bodies exposed to scalpels
represent the body at its most vulnerable. The vulnerability of corpses indicates the
townspeople’s own permeability. As with Gaskell’s female bodies, the townspeople’s fears
might be understood as a fear of the feminine. The only cadaver explicitly described in Alec
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Forbes is a female. Alec’s feud with his school rival, Beauchamp, begins because Beauchamp
insinuates the sexual licentiousness of the dead woman.
While the text praises the ability of science to understand the world and the nobility of
scientific pursuits, the respect for science and a physician’s art is qualified. Mr. Cupples warns
Alec about the danger of “com[ing] to regard a man as a physical machine, and so grow a mere
doctoring machine itself” (2: 271). This attitude is problematic from a modern perspective, for
humans are naturally physical machines. On the other hand, this quotation embodies the same
liberal notion argued earlier about the roles of characters in David Elginbrod, which is that
MacDonald does not see a person’s value as limited to just one role or position in society. Just
like Hugh Sutherland in David Elginbrod, a tutor and aspiring novelist, or David Elginbrod, an
aged bailiff but secretly passionate scholar with a rich inner life, Mr. Cupples and Alec Forbes
fluidly adopt many roles. Despite his long education then practice as a surgeon on a whaling
ship, Alec Forbes decides to become a gentleman farmer after all. Likewise, as a librarian,
amateur scientist, anatomist, and trenchant then reformed alcoholic, Mr. Cupples resists the easy
identification of any dominant role. He achieves purpose through the existential value that he
attaches to his duties as a librarian. Mr. Cupples shows that one can be a hero without practicing
a traditional kind of morality that merely avoids vice. Alcoholics can do moral things, and
despite their socially perceived challenge to traditional religion, scientists also do moral things.
The fear of the scalpel responds to this modern view of the anatomized and atomized
individual. Like the modern view of the individual as composed of many diverse elements who
need not stay within any one, fixed, God-given role in life, the scalpel indicates the divisibility of
humans. People are not neat, seamless unities. Rather, humans are composed of organic,
changing, inevitably decaying insides that work together for an indeterminate amount of time
before dissolving into disparate elements. Even the unity that living minds and bodies seemingly
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present is transitory. Throughout their lives, humans may take on different roles, change tastes in
manners and foods, change behaviors, and become better people or the inverse. The scalpel
presents a challenge to essentialist notions of the individual. Individuals are nothing but neat as
old models would have it: they are made up of insides that would preferably be left unseen by
most people. Bodies are composed of separate elements that make up a greater unity, but this
unity exists through an evolving state of flux.
Thomas and Mr. Malison further reinforce this image of individuals as dynamic, nonstatic entities. The narrator observes that “Thomas’ mind was a rendezvous for all extremes. In
him they met, and showed that they met by fighting all day long. If you knocked at his inner
door, you never could tell what would open it to you—all depending on what happened to be
uppermost in the wrestle” (1: 186-187). Though a mere stone-mason, Thomas’ attentiveness to
detail allows him to ouster Mr. Bruce from the kirk’s membership. Thomas serves as the moral
guide for all members of his town despite his frequent ill temper and disregard for institutional
norms. His natural refusal to fit within the expectations of an artisan leads to greater justice and
wholeness for Howglen’s community.
Mr. Malison, the schoolteacher of Howglen, also resists his role. Despite his authoritarian
demeanor in the classroom throughout most of the story, Mr. Malison is repeatedly defended by
the narrator as not altogether immoral, and he is redeemed by his growing affection for Truffey,
a boy that he had accidentally crippled during an instance of corporal punishment. During a great
flood that kills Tibbie, an old, blind friend of Annie’s while they lie in bed together for warmth,
Alec and Mr. Malison both redeem themselves through their heroic attempts to save other lives.
Since Tibbie and Annie are trapped in a cottage with no roof, Alec risks his life by paddling a
boat into the cottage in an attempt to save Tibbie and Annie, though only Annie is successfully
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rescued. Mr. Malison dies in his attempt to rescue Truffey from the crumbling bridge, and “their
bodies were never found” (2: 106).
Even much before his redemption, the narrator insists that “Mr. Malison was not a bad
man” (1: 197). Mr. Malison is not bad when he refuses to fulfill the assumed role of a
disciplinarian. He suffers from a split between two halves of his life. Outside the school and not
long after a scuffle caused by Alec standing up to Mr. Malison’s excessive discipline, he meets
with Alec at a bridge, and Mr. Malison tries to learn more about Alec.
I shall not have to show much more than half of Mr. Malison’s life—the school
half, which, both inwardly and outwardly, was very different from the other. The
moment he was out of the school, the moment, that is, that he ceased for the day
to be responsible for the moral and intellectual condition of his turbulent subjects,
the whole character—certainly the whole deportment—of the man changed. he
was now as meek and gentle in speech and behavior as any mother could have
desired. (1: 157)
Mr. Malison’s badness emerges from this division between self and the drive to behave
according to his given role. He achieves greater fulfillment by leaving his duties behind and
behaving like a human, not a schoolteacher. Alec goes on to describe the boat that he is building,
and Mr. Malison defends Alec’s hobby to Mrs. Forbes as an enabling means for scholarly
pursuits. The novel stresses the importance of physical exercise for Alec’s development. While
attending university later on, Alec befriends a man by the docks and goes out rowing to
“[strengthen] his growing muscles” (1: 273). Like Alec, who needs the physical labor of boatmaking to achieve a greater wholeness that allows him to become a good scholar, Mr. Malison
develops by becoming more than the role that he is expected to play.
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Character development is not portrayed as something that occurs as an individual
activity. Alec Forbes locates development as a response to the recognition of one’s smallness
within a larger network of being, though one that can only be recognized through its parts.
It was on a bright frosty evening in the end of October, that Alec entered once
more the streets of the great city. The stars were brilliant over-head, the gems in
Orion’s baldric shining oriently, and the Plough glittering with frost in the cold
blue fields of the northern sky. Below, the streets shone with their own dim stars;
and men and women wove the web of their life amongst them as they had done
for old centuries, forgetting those who had gone before, and careless of those who
were to come after. (2: 108-109)
The description of society as a web, which also appears in David Elginbrod, suggests the
interconnectedness of human life. These “stars” that are “brilliant over-head” reflect and are
reflected by similar stars created by human light. Civilization endures alongside the cosmos and
exists through a never-ending cycle of forgetting and carelessness. Unlike the stars above, the
stars below are dim and transitory. Individuals exist within a larger web of meaning, which
connects them to the past, present, and future.
This function of stars as a destabilizing yet productive influence on character
development is described in Anna Henchman’s The Starry Sky Within.
Both Hardy and Eliot rely on the analogy between an individual character’s
tendency to see him- or herself as central to the world and the perception that the
earth is the center of the universe…In many of his novels Hardy uses the
challenges that observing celestial bodies present to the astronomer to reveal the
optical roots of what becomes a moral problem of failing to register the fullness of
another person’s existence. He repeatedly uses characters’ observations of
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individual celestial bodies to shed light on the difficult of knowing other minds.
By contrast, individual celestial bodies are rarely central to Eliot’s invocations of
astronomy. Instead, Eliot’s analysis of egotism in individual characters is
frequently linked to the perception that the universe is organized around the earth.
(166)
The function of stars in Alec Forbes is similar to Eliot’s use of stars as a cosmic reminder of
decentered smallness, for “Eliot contrasts this limited sense of scope with the increased sense of
the largeness of the world” (194). Alec’s experience of the stars leads to a greater appreciation
for the beauty of the universe in its starry, never quite knowable expansiveness. His recognition
of smallness under the stars indicates his transition from a childish, self-centered view of himself
to a decentered, mature view that is oriented outward like Gwendolyn of Daniel Deronda who
“get[s] a sense that her horizon was but a dipping onward of an existence with which her own
was revolving” (194).
This sense of unity achieved through a recognized cooperation of elements appears
through Alec’s surgical practices. Because his studies lead to engagement with the world through
the close study of individual things, his scholarly pursuits lead to the development of his
character. While Alec’s commitment to becoming a physician requires moral development
beyond the improvement that his studies provide, the narrative nevertheless frames his resistance
to public criticism and the distractions of university pleasures as nothing short of heroic. Early in
his studies, Alec embodies the tireless yet socially castigated scientist. He spends long hours
working in the “dissecting room…after the other students had gone” and ends up falling asleep at
one point after lying down his scalpel (1: 265). As later revealed by Mr. Cupples, Beauchamp
lurks at the window. Alec does not discern that Beauchamp is watching him. Nevertheless, Alec
detects an “eerie” presence and leaves hurriedly. Only after he “had his tea, and learned a new
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proposition of Euclid” is he able to leave the “fright…far behind him” (1: 266). The act of
learning leads him out of his own misery.
The nature of knowledge is presented as social. The benefits of scholarship are related to
its sociality and engagement in ongoing discourse with other people. For all its acts of dissection,
scientific knowledge connects past and present generations. The study of individual parts leads to
a greater understanding of wholes, even if these wholes are ever-shifting. After Alec experiences
the cold indifference of Kate due to Beauchamp’s seduction of her, Mr. Cupples humorously yet
truly achieves “some perception of the real condition of Alec’s feelings” by launching into a
“humorous travesty of a lecture on physics” (2: 114).
Ye ken weel eneuch what I mean. There’s a trouble upo’ ye. I’m no speirin’ ony
questons. But jist haud a grip o’ yersel’. Rainbows! Rainbows!—We’ll jist hae a
walk thegither, an’ I’ll instruck ye i’ the first prenciples o’ naiteral philosophy.—
First, ye see, there’s the attraction o’ graivitation, and syne there’s the attraction
o’cohesion, and syne there’s the attraction o’ adhesion; though I’m thinkin’, i’ the
lang run, they’ll be a’ fun’ to be ane and the same. And syne there’s the attraction
o’ affeenity, whilk differs mair nor a tae’s length frae the lave. In hit, ye see, ae
thing taks till anither for a whilie, and hauds gey and sicker till‘t, till anither
comes ‘at it likes better, whaurupon there’s a proceedin’ i’ the Chancery o’
Natur—only it disna aye haud lang, and there’s nae lawyers’ fees—and the tane’s
straughtways divorced frae the tither. (2: 114)
By describing the first principles of physics, Mr. Cupples analogically describes Alec’s
condition. One of the constant themes of Cupples’ description is the inconstancy of attraction, for
“ae thing taks till anither for a whilie, and hauds gey and sicker till ‘t, till anither comes ‘at it
likes better, whaurupon there’s a proceedin’ I’ the Chancery o’ Natur—.”
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In addition to mere sociality, scientific knowledge at this time is rendered as inevitably
public as displayed through the responses to a prank pulled by Alec and his fellow prankster and
close friend, Curly, on the townspeople of Howglen. They tie together the tails of cows, horses, a
sheep, a goat, several dogs, and a cat (a rabbit is tied to its tail). This absurd spectacle literalizes
the Chain of Being. It appears as a “strange monster” created by the “accretion of living joints”
(1: 219), but at first sight, the scene is more amusing than threatening.
Staring up the street towards the sunset, which coloured all their faces a red
bronze, stood a group of townsfolk, momently increasing, from which, before
Wattie’s party could reach it, burst a general explosion of laughter. It was some
moments, however, before they understood what was the matter, for the great
mild sun shone full in their eyes. At length they saw, as if issuing from the huge
heavy orb, a long dark line, like a sea-serpent of a hundred joints, coming down
the street towards them, and soon discovered that it was a slow procession of
animals.
When Mrs Stephen[, the cow], reached the square, she turned to lead her train
diagonally across it, for in that direction lay her home. Moved by the same desire,
the cadger’s horse wanted to go in exactly the opposite direction. The cow pulled
the one way, and the horse pulled the other; but the cow, having her head free,
had this advantage over the horse, which was fast at both ends. So he gave in, and
followed his less noble leader. (1: 219-220)
In this passage, the traditional Chain of Being perspective is portrayed as an inadequate
hierarchy. By leading the horse, the cow moves beyond a fixed position of docility as one “less
noble” than a horse. The hierarchy is collapsed. On another level, this scene corresponds to an
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evolutionary model of connected organisms. The public responds in a way that is deflated of
malice and suspicion. Evolution is neither fearful nor deserving of public hysteria.
One qualification presents itself. The narrative calls attention to the damage done to the
cadger’s horse and the rabbit. This horse as described as a “gaunt sepulchral animal, which age
and ill-treatment had taught to move as if knees and hocks were useless refinements in
locomotion” (1: 219). The rabbit belongs to Tibbie, the lame boy. Thomas confronts Alec after
the prank by “pulling the dead rabbit out of his pocket, and holding it up by the ears. ‘Ca' ye that
no hairm?’” (1: 222). Despite the unobtrusiveness of evolution as a naturalistic theory, the
cobbling together of organisms to make some grand narrative that naturalizes violence is seen as
dangerous. The fault does not lie in the theory, but the caution lies in a fear of its endorsement of
inevitable violence.
Despite its productive capabilities, intellectual knowledge is not enough on its own.
While Alec’s scholarship aids his development, this development is only tempered by his
restored kinship with the people of his community. He “never practised in his profession, but
became a first-rate farmer” (2: 326). Mr. Cupples “never married. But he wrote a good book” (2:
326). Until he acknowledges the goodness of God and the universe, Cupples cannot “find or
invent a theory of the universe which could show it still beautiful despite of passing pain” (1:
257). People find fulfillment in different ways. Alec finds fulfillment in his studies for a time,
and then he moves on to something else. Alec Forbes stresses the dynamism of characters.
Characters are praised for challenging traditional forms and engaging themselves in scientific
pursuits, which recognize the cooperation of elements and the transitory nature of all unities.
Alec Forbes reveals the religious attitudes and orientations that allow for an increased receptivity
to science. These attitudes include receptivity to change and recognition of one’s small place in
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the universe. Only these orientations to truth can create a restored sense of self in relation to
others.
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Evolutionary Diversity and Change:
Lilith’s Celebratory Assessment
Published in 1895, Lilith is subtitled “A Romance.” This statement departs from the
marketing of his other adult fairy tale, Phantastes: A Faerie Romance for Men and Women,
which was published in 1858. The dropped-off “faerie” suggests an altered motive for Lilith. The
novel does not invest in fairy tales for their own sake. Rather, the text is concerned with
relational attitudes towards science, evolutionary debates, and public education and attitudes
toward science. However, why does MacDonald invest in a fairy tale to discuss matters of
science? There are at least three possibilities. The first possibility is that MacDonald found his
fairy tales to be readily marketable, and Lilith has the function of continuing Phantastes’ creation
of an adult fairy tale narrative. The second possibility is that the guise of a fairy tale has the
potential to ameliorate merely reactionary attitudes towards evolution and science. Fairy tales
seem like a turn towards the past, so the use of them for different ends has the possibility for
productive subversion. Quite related to this possibility is that anthropologists like Edward Tylor
had located a protoscientific worldview in the past, which departed from earlier totemic models.
Thus, Lilith’s reification of past folklore brings attention to contemporary anthropological
debates.
The third possibility is that MacDonald may have written a story with fairy-tale elements
simply because he wanted to write one. This explanation seems like pure conjecture and too trite
to be worth mentioning, but there is textual evidence in Alec Forbes to support this view. In Alec
Forbes, the narrator talks about one of the characters wandering off into the woods and observes
that “if she were only small enough to go wandering about in it, what wonders might she not
discover!—But I forget that I am telling a story, and not writing a fairy-tale” (1: 262). This slip
reveals MacDonald’s natural propensity for this genre. Having published Heather and Snow in
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1893 after several nonfictional works and going on to publish Salted with Fire in 1896, just a
year after Lilith’s publication in 1895, MacDonald may have desired a return to the genre that
began his success, the mode in which he seems most comfortable.
Regardless of motives, the use of fairy tale elements stands in unison with a certain
aspect of his contemporary counterpart, Andrew Lang. As Kathy Psomiades notes in “Hidden
Meaning: Andrew Lang, H. Rider Haggard, Sigmund Freud, and Interpretation,” Andrew Lang
argued for Edward Tylor’s model against the totemic model proposed by Max Müller: “for
Tylor, myths are not the debased form of an originally poetic/philosophical/religious approach to
the mysteries of the universe, but a primitive form of science. Myth originates in ‘that actual
experience of nature and life, which is the ultimate source of human fancy’” (par. 9). MacDonald
valorizes Tylor’s model by using the fairy tale genre to consider the relationship of humans to
scientific knowledge and nature.
Since they participate in a shared ontological purpose of being, the story’s narrator, Mr.
Vane, finds affirmation for being through his degree of difference from other things like flowers
and other species. By taking this approach, MacDonald reveals his Romantic inclinations but
moves beyond the standpoint of an elevated subjectivity ala Romanticism: the story’s narrator
can only know others through knowing himself, and by knowing others, he is able to return to a
better understanding of himself through an acknowledgement of his participation in a larger
network of being itself and beings. Difference and change are celebrated throughout the
narrative. The thoughts of God, which give rise to different species and animate existence, are
transitory like “lightnings that took shape as they flashed from him to his” (340) to produce
creative diversity.
In Lilith, an Oxford graduate named Mr. Vane is said to inherit an ancestral home at a
young age. However, he does not assume management of the home until the completion of his
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studies at Oxford, which is the point at which this novel begins. This home is seemingly haunted
by an old librarian who is later revealed to be Adam from the Book of Genesis. This old librarian
is known to Mr. Vane as Mr. Raven and sometimes appears as a literal raven. As a librarian,
Adam leads the narrator into an attic, which holds a machine that allows for interdimensional
travel. The majority of the narrative takes place in an alternate dimension, which figures as a sort
of purgatory or intermediary afterlife. Though the experience does not last, Mr. Vane is
seemingly resurrected in this afterlife.
Despite the fantastical elements of this narrative, the novel clearly participates in the
evolutionary debates of its time and how humans relate to knowledge. Taking evolutionary
thought for granted, Lilith explores how humans might relate and respond to evolutionary
knowledge. In the very first chapter, the narrator talks about his reading practices.
In the great room I mainly spent my time, reading books of science, old as well as
new; for the history of the human mind in relation to supposed knowledge was
what most interested me. Ptolemy, Dante, the two Bacons, and Boyle were even
more to me than Darwin or Maxwell, as so much nearer the vanished van
breaking into the dark of ignorance. (2)
MacDonald’s narrator has a relational attitude towards science. Rather than existing as a thingin-itself, science matters to the narrator because humans exist in a relational position towards the
subject. Furthermore, this passage reveals whom the narrator (and perhaps MacDonald) was
reading. Mr. Vane prefers writers that deal with epistemological questions and a priori
considerations of knowledge rather than applied knowledge or “supposed knowledge” (2). This
supposed knowledge might conceivably refer to all knowledge, especially the knowledge that
humans suppose about the contours of science, morality, nature, etc. MacDonald’s narrator does
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not reject developments in natural philosophy, but he is more concerned with how humans relate
to this knowledge.
Peter Garratt describes this turn. As he explains in Victorian Empiricism, “philosophical
ideas require narrative to embody them,” and the “direction of the analysis” of knowledge is
“moved inward, as it were, toward the knowing subject” (161). This move is shaped by the
“tension between interiority and exteriority, one that is crucial to the epistemological structure of
empiricism itself” (161). The elevation of relativism marks the 19th century. Although the writers
that Mr. Vane mentions come from a past era, they are not outmoded. Rather, they represent the
contemporary turn towards an increased consideration of relativity, a “tradition [that] preferred
more or less to bracket the real object in itself, concentrating its primary interest instead on
sequences of impressions and ideas” (162). Like David Elginbrod, Lilith stresses this relativity of
minds to knowledge and prizes associationism.
This type of concern matches with the populist emphasis on science during the 1860s,
which is around when MacDonald began to achieve success as a writer with the publication of
Phantastes in 1858. There then existed a rising interest in how science affects the public, the
supposed epoch, religion, social habits, and what people do with knowledge. In the 1890s, during
which Lilith was published, the correspondent nature of public and professional science led to
increased resistance against scientific naturalism by formerly irregular means. Ted Underwood
notes in “How Did the Conservation of Energy become ‘The Highest Law in All Science?’” that
“there was…a popular audience for scientific ideas…the universe of authenticated science was
growing large; in the general-interest monthlies and nascent magazines of ‘popular science’”
(119). Lilith participates in this rising public awareness of knowledge. As a book that engaged
with these issues, though often indirectly, Lilith was readily marketable. It achieved great
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marketing success in both England and the United States as Dodd, Mead & Co. published several
editions.
Though full of spiritual mysticism and elements of a fairy tale, the narrative offers
unexpectedly naturalistic explanations for phenomena. The narrator’s experience in this
purgatorial afterlife is chalked up to a dream narrative. This dream is presented as possibly
emerging from a divine source, but this source does not collide with its plausibly physical
origins. At the story’s close, the narrator says, “I know not whether these things rise in my brain,
or enter it from without. I do not seek them; they come, and I let them go” (350). Like writing,
the dream can claim to be inspired and proffer access to an imaginative, mystical experience, but
this narrative’s location and events cannot be claimed as reality because doing so would place
the text beyond the realm of fantasy and thus open to closer scrutiny. If the narrator’s
experiences are granted a definitively divine origin, then MacDonald would be presenting his
own ideas about mysticism as objectively certain. By refusing this positivism, the narrative
enforces its credibility and provides the desired mystical experience of what it might be like to be
dead then resurrected. Where post “two cultures” critiques impugned science for inflexible
concreteness, “one culture” writers like MacDonald celebrated it for its relationism and
dynamism.
The epistemological uncertainty of Mr. Vane is reinforced when he describes his
thoughts as things that “come,” which he must “let…go” (350). By entertaining these thoughts
and fantasies, Mr. Vane accepts the limitations of mysticism to provide certainty. Although he
does not deny the value of his experiences, he will not claim them as objective. This feature
places the narrative into dialogue with the epistemological uncertainty that characterizes a rising
modernity. Mr. Vane’s lack of certainty does not serve as a defect but instead boosts his
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reputation to contemporary readers by appealing to the increasing clout of epistemological
uncertainty.
This kind of reflexivity about providing a plausible, natural explanation for the
narrative’s events communicates a textual anxiety that seems out-of-place for a story with such
fantastical elements. The story resists being identified with fantasy. Lilith is fantastical but not
fantasy. The narrative is grounded in the plausibility of its events. Conceivably, this narrator
could have dreams with strange, archetypal features and rhythms. Tylor’s model provides an
explanatory description of these things as protoscientific, ingrained qualities of the human mind.
These explanations place Lilith within the genre of realism, a realism that is highly invested in
the interiority of Mr. Vane and the universality of his experience. By delving into the depths of
consciousness, the story is really exploring all minds.
As a scientist and the father of all humankind, Adam embodies Tylor’s “protoscientific”
individual. Adam serves as a model for a broadly considered humanity. Mr. Vane describes
Adam as one who can “[see] through accident into entity” (14). Adam captures light and energy
with a machine by pulling on a series of chains, which creates a portal to a parallel dimension,
and he is able to speak to the narrator about “dimensions, telling [him] that there were more than
three, some of them concerned with powers which were indeed in us, but of which as yet we
knew absolutely nothing” (54). Despite the allusion to psychic powers, the text’s practice of
referring back to this extraordinary event, interdimensional travel, to a term used in discourse
about natural philosophy, “dimensions,” reinforces the importance of science, even for
discussing matters that border on the spiritual.
Alluding to evolutionary theory when he describes the “steppes of Uranus,” Adam
describes to Mr. Vane the species that live there. Adam says that the “animals there are all
burrowers…like the field-mice and the moles here.—They will be, for ages to come” (21). The
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uses of the future tense and emphasis on change after many ages, however long these might be,
suggest the mutability of these organisms. Occurring over ages, change is portrayed as inevitable
and gradual. The narrator embodies a reactionary view towards evolution when he says that the
danger of Adam turning a worm into a butterfly is that “it will grow proud, and cease to
recognise its superiors” (23). A rare interruption from a third-person narrator beyond the usual
first-person narration immediately observes that “no man knows when he is making an idiot of
himself” (23), which blatantly rejects Mr. Vane’s reactionary response.
Biological language provides fertile metaphors for spiritual progress. Adam rhetorically
asks, “does a sexton toss worms in the air, and turn them into butterflies?” (37). Of course,
worms do not become butterflies, and the narrator pushes this point elsewhere: “you mistake,
Mr. Raven: worms are not the larvæ of butterflies!” (23). Adam cautiously replies, “I’m not a
reading man at present, but sexton at the—at a certain grave-yard—cemetery, more properly—
in—at—no matter where!” (23). Although Adam professes ignorance, he is actually quite the
successful scientist, for he is able to do things like manipulate machines to connect parallel
universes, and he recurrently refers to scientific concerns. Adam’s profession of ignorance
should be read as MacDonald’s anxiety about getting some of the scientific facts wrong. If Adam
himself cannot claim to be a “reading man at present,” then surely MacDonald the writer cannot
be blamed for getting a few scientific facts wrong. Seventy-years-old when this story was
published, MacDonald was living in Italy at the time and would remain there from 1879 to 1900.
This authorial position presents the possibility that MacDonald was anxious about appearing not
caught up with the current expectations of an English “reading man,” since during this time, he
was largely consumed with founding a literary studio named Casa Coraggio.
For all his reactionary viewpoints at the beginning of Lilith, Mr. Vane comes to
participate in scientific behaviors beyond his reading lists. He experimentally tests the reality of
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his world by forcing himself to wake up after his resurrection in this alternate dimension. When
he leaves this realm and finds himself back within his home, he tests the levers of the machine
that initially brought him there. Mr. Vane’s curiosity about the nature of things leads to all the
story’s events, not divine disclosure. The divine disclosure comes later, but the narrator has to
work for it using natural means. Though Hugh’s reentrance into this alternate dimension occurs
after simply falling asleep four nights later, his efforts to get back into this frame of mind are
what bring him back to the dimension. The narrator’s attempts to transcribe a manuscript are
analogous to the scientific process. The “aroma of an idea,” which is caused by the “mutilation”
of the full text, a manuscript that borders the two dimensions and is tucked into a corner of the
bookshelf, nevertheless “rous[es] in [the narrator] a great longing to know what the poem or
poems might, even yet in their mutilation, hold or suggest” (18).
Lilith is identified as part of the collective unconscious. Her language “seem[s] the
primeval shape of one I knew well,” which recalls the monogenesis theory of language that
sustained a high level of currency at this time. The story that she tells in this language causes Mr.
Vane to imagine “forms [that] belong to dreams which had once been mine, but refused to be
recalled” (282). Despite the narrator’s failure to recall these ancestral dreams, they exist as part
of the appeal of Lilith in the present. More than just a totemic holdover, this attraction further
fuels his curiosity and causes him to engage himself in the project to rid Lilith of her deformed
grasp, her hand that has been held shut since time immemorial.
Like the protoscientism of our evolutionary heritage, there are other kinds of prototypes
in Lilith. In the recreated universe, Mr. Vane sees that “the prototypes of all the gems I had loved
on earth” have become “more beautiful” after the transformation of the universe (347). Thus, the
anticipated Restoration becomes fulfilled and realized in time. Described as “the spring of the
universe” (57), this seasonal reference suggests an organic cycle. The wintery gems provide a
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prototype for the living gems of the spring. Things start out as non-living matter and have the
potential to become living. These new gems are described as “waked up gems” (345), which
alludes to abiogenesis. The text accepts that living things can arise from non-organic matter.
The gems’ transformation into something “more beautiful” also suggests a teleological
purpose to evolution. As well, the narrator’s observation that “not one monkey of any kind”
(342) can be seen in the transformed universe implies that monkeys are just lesser-evolved
humans that are bound for extinction due to their lack of completion. While problematic from a
modern understanding of evolution, this unidirectional, progressive idea of evolution did not
merely die out with the publication of The Origin of Species in 1859. Though mistaken, the text’s
belief in directionality or purpose to evolution should not discount this text’s creative
engagement with discourse surrounding evolution. In other ways, Lilith rejects reactionary views
towards evolution. For example, humankind is not seen as the pinnacle of biological perfection.
The text portrays humans as just part of a larger biological network of an enormous, everchanging diversity.
My bare feet seemed to love every plant they trod upon. The world and my being,
its life and mine, were one. The microcosm and macrocosm were at length atoned,
at length in harmony! I lived in everything; everything entered and lived in me.
To be aware of a thing, was to know its life at once and mine, to know whence we
came, and where we were at home—was to know that we are all what we are,
because Another is what he is! (337)
The “Another” both refers to the existence of other things that are not self and also God. This
expanded understanding of “Another” as a reference to something beyond an orthodox
conception of God is supported by the surplus of non-dualistic language and stress on the
interdependence of things that are another. The non-dualistic language continues. The narrator
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feels that when “a little breeze brushing a bush of heather set its purple bells a ringing, I was
myself in the joy of the bells, myself in the joy of the breeze to which responded their sweet tintinning” (338).
Humanity is not unduly elevated above other things in nature. Upon first meeting Mr.
Raven, the disguised Adam, Mr. Vane asks him whether “am I wrong, then, in presuming that a
man is superior to a bird?” (14). Mr. Raven says that “that is at it may be. We do not waste our
intellects in generalising, but take man or bird as we find them” (14). Adam’s rhetorical
maneuver deconstructs the question’s importance by calling attention to the impossibility of
making such a gross generalization. This maneuver further calls attention to the slippery
definition of the word “superior.” In doing so, the text rejects the Chain of Being perspective that
Darwin’s ideas came to supplant.
Lilith’s recreated universe departs from an orthodox understanding of a New Heaven and
New Earth because of its celebration of change, which contrasts with an atemporal, static image
of the afterlife. This new world is one within time, one with “tens of thousands of changing
forms” (338). The change itself is celebrated, not because these forms change into something
permanent but simply because these forms change. Paradoxically, the completion of forms lies in
their transience. This transience appears in how the narrator describes his memory of the story’s
events. Mr. Vane observes that “as often as I try to fit the reality with nearer words, I find myself
in danger of losing the things themselves, and feel like one in process of awaking from a dream,
with the thing that seemed familiar gradually yet swiftly changing through a succession of forms
until its very nature is no longer recognisable” (12). These “succession of forms” serve to
describe human thought but also God’s by extension through recurrent descriptions of humans as
microcosms. The text takes the position that thoughts must inevitably “swiftly chang[e]” and lose
a “nature” that is “recognisable.” While these aspects of thought and memory make it difficult
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for the narrator to describe his experience, this transitory quality of thought is not lamented but
rather seen as part of the natural process of things.
Lilith praises change in other ways. At one point, Mr. Vane finds himself viewing a party
of skeletal figures. As skeletons, these figures represent humans stripped to their most basic,
lasting element like the cadavers in Alec Forbes. The language is telling: “if I seemed to catch
the shape and rhythm of a dance, it was but to see it break, and confusion prevail” (185). This
“wildly changing kaleidoscopic scene” (185) considers humanity through their purely material
existence. Humanity exists in a state of flux; while the “shape” and “rhythm” of a “dance” might
occasionally appear, all that remains is chaos. The reality of these shapes and rhythms is not
established. There is room in MacDonald’s cosmology for chance.
The text has room for other things as well. While the text describes this new “life” as “a
cosmic holiday” (338), there are still loathsome creatures.
[Where] once had wallowed the monsters of the earth…A whirlpool had swept
out the soil in which the abortions burrowed, and at the bottom lay visible the
whole horrid brood: a dim greenish light pervaded the crystalline water, and
revealed every hideous form beneath it. Coiled in spires, folded in layers, knotted
on themselves, or “extended long and large,” they weltered in motionless
heaps…He who dived in the swirling Malestrom saw none to compare with them
in horror: tentacular convolutions, tumid bulges, glaring orbs of sepian deformity,
would have looked to him innocence beside such incarnations of hatefulness.
(339)
This new universe does not preclude the existence of monsters, for “they were not dead,” even
though “not one of them moved” (339). Earlier, in his ordinary world, the narrator sees a “thrush
breaking his way into the shell of a snail” (20), which calls attention to the naturalness of
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violence. Violence is portrayed as part of the natural order. While the narrative does not go far
enough to claim that the new universe will have active monsters, MacDonald is clearly
comfortable with a teleological end to the universe with evil vanquished and castrated but not a
merely passing reality.
In a universe with dangerous environments and predation, species must adapt. Lilith
explores this issue through the Little Ones. A small community of miniature, child-like beings,
these are the departed souls of infants and children who died before maturity, not unlike the Lost
Boys of Neverland. These Little Ones appear elsewhere in MacDonald’s writings. However, they
do not usually represent the souls of lost infants and children: this feature is peculiar to Lilith. In
Fairy Tales, Natural History and Victorian Culture, Laurence Talairach-Vielmas claims that
MacDonald’s Little Ones functionally “connect contemporary anthropological research with
fairy tales” (153). He further claims that the “connections that were drawn between the Little
People, now viewed as less evolved creatures with childlike characteristics, and children – [was]
a parallel which brought home the way in which ontology was then believed to recapitulate
phylogeny” (153). The Little Ones have the same function in Lilith, and they go through an
evolutionary episode of their own.
After the narrator returns to the country where the Little Ones live, he finds that they no
longer live in bushes. Instead, they have migrated to the forest to avoid the giants who “began to
destroy the trees on whose fruits the Little Ones lived” (229). Mr. Vane’s favorite of the Little
Ones and future bed-neighbor, Lona, in the mausoleum of beds that Adam maintains, explains
how the Little Ones came to live in trees after Mr. Vane’s initial departure.
[She] reflected that where birds, there the Little Ones could find habitation. They
had eager sympathies with all modes of life, and could learn of the wildest
creatures: why should they not take refuge from the cold and their enemies in the
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tree-tops? why not, having lain in the low brushwood, seek now the lofty foliage?
why not build nests where it would not serve to scoop hollows? (230)
This strategy works quite well, for the giants “came ere long to the conclusion that they had
frightened [the Little Ones] out of the country” (230). This scene is an evolutionary scenario: the
Little Ones are easily outclassed by strong predators, but their cunning allows them to adapt their
biological behaviors in order to survive.
On the other hand, this change is not, strictly speaking, evolutionary because the Little
Ones cannot reproduce and pass on these changes. Although their capabilities seem to expand as
they become ready climbers, mimicking the lifestyles of birds, and become stronger, learning
how to throw rocks and ride small elephants and horses, these changes are technically not
Darwinian evolution because these changes result from their behaviors. These changes are not
quite expressions of a belated Lamarckism, either, because these changed behaviors do not result
in an altered biology that is passed down. The adaptation is closest to one particular author-critic
of Darwinism, Samuel Butler. In Evolution: The History of an Idea, Peter Bowler notes that
“Butler [eventually] began to see in Lamarckism the prospect of retaining an indirect form of the
design argument,” (259) which appealed to him greatly. This possibility would allow for a God
that “might exist within the process of a living development, represented by its innate creativity”
(259). Adam refers to this innate creativity when he claims that everyone contains a “beast-self,”
“bird-self,” a “fish-self,” and a “creeping serpent-self too” (37). This notion provides a
supplemental explanation of what has already been examined, which are the “powers which were
indeed in us, but of which as yet we knew absolutely nothing” (54). This language points
towards an “innate creativity,” a divinity to species that allows for the variation of species.
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Lilith alludes to Butler through the resemblances between the city of Bulika, which Lilith
rules over, and Samuel Butler’s Erewhon. Upon entering Bulika, the narrator finds himself lost
and ignored.
Oftener than once or twice I appealed to passers-by whom I fancied more
benevolent-looking, but none would halt a moment to listen to me. I looked poor,
and that was enough: to the citizens of Bulika, as to house-dogs, poverty was an
offence! Deformity and sickness were taxed; and no legislation of their princess
was more heartily approved of than what tended to make poverty subserve wealth.
(162)
The criminality of poverty and sickness also appears in Erewhon. This similar presentation of a
dystopic society further supports the idea that MacDonald was reading Samuel Butler and
entertained Butler’s views on evolution.
Like Charles Kingsley (and to a lesser extent, Samuel Butler), MacDonald stresses
intentionality and design to evolutionary change, especially in regards to individuals. Lilith’s sin
is described as being “what she had made herself” instead of “what God had intended her to be”
(283). This notion of God as in possession of deliberate intentions for individuals is further
reinforced by the symbolic functions of names in the story. Mara, Adam and Eve’s daughter who
is also known as the “Cat-woman” (95) by the Little People, observes that Mr. Vane has a “real
name…written on [his] forehead” (100). This “real name” suggests that his identity has been
handed to him, even though “at present [his name] whirls about so irregularly that nobody can
read it” (100). Mara hopes that it will “settle at last” (100), which means that Mr. Vane will
become what God intends him to be.
This view of the individual is very different than David Elginbrod’s treatment of the
individual. While Hugh Sutherland of David Elginbrod and its other characters are consistently

Hoenzsch 49
described as transcendentally unknowable, partially due to their interdependence with nature and
society but also due to a transcendental notion of the human subject, Lilith suggests that
individuals have particular identities that, while not fixed immediately, eventually arrive at an
eternally static state. However, this treatment of names in the text seemingly runs counter to the
dynamism of an anticipated new heaven and earth. Perhaps this different perspective is due to the
generic expectations of fantasy. The genre anticipates a just, complete, and divinely ordained
ending for its characters. By providing this sort of resolution to names, the story fulfills its
generic expectations.
Although Lilith does not fully present the same level of nuanced treatment about
individuals that David Elginbrod so effectively provides, this difference can be partially
attributed to the difference in genre. For all MacDonald’s Christian machinations and belief in
divine intentionality, they do not limit his scientific concerns. This novel brings public attention
to contemporary debates of its time. Lilith is obsessed with natural science and humankind’s
relationship to science, and the diverse products of an evolved and evolving world are praised
and celebrated throughout its bold narrative.
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Conclusion
Through their interactions with science, MacDonald’s writings provide a novel
perspective for nineteenth-century studies. Because of his peculiar features as a non-institutional
Christian who espouses a form of panentheism, an elevated respect for scientific endeavors, and
liberal interaction with emergent scientific knowledge, MacDonald should be reinstated within
this discussion. Though he has not yet experienced a scholarly resurgence, MacDonald has
recently reached a wider audience through adaptations. During the writing of this thesis, a
musical stage adaptation of The Light Princess was performed by the Royal National Theatre in
London and had an extended run. Its musical producer, Tori Amos, described the piece in a May
5th, 2014 interview as a “feminist fairy tale.” Her attitude and the highly positive reception to this
musical suggest that this refiguring of a formerly crossed-out author is already underway. A
scholarly resurgence is needed to explain and understand his modern appeal.
Universal Music Group will release a 33-track cast recording of the musical during 2015,
and numerous other adaptations have appeared over the last few years that interact with
MacDonald in some way. These adaptations and interactions with MacDonald’s life include the
play A Bright Particular Star by Ron Reed that was performed in 2006. It portrays the cultural
pressures that MacDonald’s daughter, Lily, faced in her acting endeavors. Twyla Tharp created a
ballet adaptation in 2012 that was co-commissioned by Atlanta Ballet and Royal Winnipeg
Ballet. These adaptations have not been contained to the stage. Colin Downey directed The
Shadows, which is based on the story by MacDonald by the same name and had a 2013 release in
Ireland by Galway Film Fleadh. Recent adaptations indicate a trickling though rising resurgence
of MacDonald in the public consciousness.
MacDonald should continue to be read outside of the traditional assessment of him as a
fairy-tale writer with little to no critical investment over how his writings react to changing

Hoenzsch 51
attitudes of his period. This approach allows for alternative views beyond standard, canonical
divisions between reactionary authors towards science and more liberal endorsers and admirers.
MacDonald has been faultily located within the former camp, but he fits more properly into the
latter. His views on God and nature prefigure the advent of process theology, but his usefulness
is and should not be contained to theologians.
George MacDonald’s utilization of scientific language and scientifically influenced
aesthetics reveals submerged, nuanced dialogue on these issues that needs to enter the forefront
of nineteenth-century discussions on the novel. His positive, liberal position on the benefits of a
scientific worldview provides a model that challenges an understanding of nineteenth-century
religious novelists as necessarily reactionary or averse to change. The materialist explanations
that are provided for seemingly supernatural occurrences in Lilith challenge an understanding
that novels with fairy-tale elements lie outside the realist tradition. Time will tell whether
MacDonald studies achieve further traction. His reentrance into the public consciousness
through the success of recently successful stage productions may contribute to this development.
This thesis optimistically concludes that regardless of what form future engagement embodies,
MacDonald’s novels will continue to bear fruit for assessments that break with tradition and
attempt to interact with his texts through a historically grounded, scientifically-oriented lens.
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